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The concept of order is often neglected in the study of conflict ± 
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examination of rebel governance however, bringing order back into our 
understanding of rebel and insurgent groups has much to offer in 
exploring the everyday politics which connect authorities, rebel 
movements and the population itself, in a complex mass of 
intersubjective and power-based interactions and negotiations. Rebels 
both shape and are shaped by existing forms of order in complex and 
ongoing ways. This article explores how varying elements interact in the 
negotiation, framing and enforcement of order and develops an original 
analytical framework to examine the perpetual negotiations of rebel 
movements in their attempts to cement their control. 
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Order is a frequently under-utilised and under-theorised analytical concept in the 
study of conflict and post-conflict situations. When the term is deployed it is 
frequently conflated with the connected, but separate, notion of security, it is often 
used without explanation or exploration, comes loaded with normative assumptions 
about ideal types and is deployed as a descriptive rather than an analytical tool. Yet, 
order as an analytical concept has much to offer the study of societies of all kinds, 
and especially those experiencing conflict, because it offers opportunities to explore 
the everyday politics which connect authorities, rebel movements, criminal gangs 
and the population itself, in a complex mass of intersubjective and power-based 
interactions and negotiations. Until relatively recently studies of order drew on 
Hobbes' notion of a strong unitary actor which imposed its rules through coercion 
and outright violence. The study of order from a political perspective has always 
been focused on the state and its formation and consolidation processes, leaving the 
challengers to states understudied in terms of their own governance processes or 
simply dismissed as the forces of disorder.  
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Rebel Governance as a field of enquiry1 has recently received increased attention 
and together with studies of the micro-dynamics of Civil Wars more broadly2 has 
seen the development of more innovative approaches which have begun to paint a 
more nuanced picture of both the tools and aims of rebel governance, as well as the 
constraints which shape the extent and style of rebel governance across space and 
time.3 However despite this encouraging uptick in focus, much of the attention tends 
to still fall on two aspects: specific rebel uses of violence and their recruitment or 
financing processes.4 Alongside this there has also been increased interest in rebel 
transition to political parties within post-conflict settlements.5 This has left a fairly 
substantial gap in the literature which has received far less focus, that of how rebel 
groups actually govern areas within their control, not just in terms of their own 
processes and power but in terms of how existing localised forms of order interact 
with those forms of order which rebels wish to promote. Clearly what is important to 
explore are not only rebel uses of violence and the extraction of resources which 
have been the focus of so much study but also the rebels' use of other mechanisms, 
key among them their legitimacy. Few are the rebel groups which do not attempt to 
create and deploy their legitimacy to assist their rule, but too often studies of the 
uses of violence and/or the legitimacy of rebel groups neglect to fully recognise the 
trade-off required by the long and short term goals of rebel governance, and how, 
despite greater coercive power, insurgents who wish to govern must engage with 
other forms of power and other powerbrokers. In other words, rebels shape and are 
shaped by existing forms of order in complex and ongoing ways, it is these 
negotiations over the written and unwritten rules which order everyday life that is the 
true crucible in which rebel governance is forged.    
In order to explore these processes in more detail this article begins by examining 
the various threads which combine to shape and sustain order. It then goes on to 
identify how these elements interact in the negotiation, framing and enforcement of 
order. This provides a platform upon which to begin to construct an analytical 
framework which centres on the interactions of power, legitimacy, authority and 
culture. This framework helps explore the processes by which rebel movements 
continually adapt in their attempts to cement their control - specifically the ways in 
which they shape, try to shape and are shaped by existing social structures. It is 
through the examination of the processes of the (re-)emergence of order(s) and the 
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multiple and ongoing negotiations, both formal and informal, in which rebel groups 
must engage in order to govern that form the focus of this analysis.  
Using Hezbollah to illustrate the development of this framework, the article highlights 
themes within the framework by examining the realities faced by the Party of God in 
its negotiation of political, social and cultural order with different interest groups and 
authorities within Lebanon. Hezbollah has been able to successfully negotiate its rise 
not only to dominance over its associated identity group - the Shi'a of Lebanon, but 
has also been able to negotiate with other groups in society to secure itself a role in 
the governance of the entire country. In doing this it has been able to shape 
expectations and structures of order at both a localised and national level within 
Lebanon but has in turn been shaped by other forces of order within its own 
community and within the wider Lebanese socio-political environment. It is the 
perfect example with which to illustrate the fact that rebel orders are built both upon 
and alongside existing social and cultural orders which (re-)emerge both during and 
in the aftermath of conflict, demonstrating how rebel order endures only if it remains 
responsive to other forms of order.  
Order as an Analytical Concept in Rebel Governance 
Order conditions almost every aspect of our social, political and economic lives, it 
acts as a flexible and evolving structure which helps to shape our interactions with 
the world and is in turn also shaped by patterns of human agency. It can best be 
defined as a set of predictable behaviours, structured by widely known and accepted 
rules which govern regular human interactions and behaviours.6 In large part it is 
rooted in the functional and psychological human need for stability and predictability, 
meaning that ordering devices permeate every form of human social organisation. 
This, of course, makes it an ideal tool with which to explore the functioning of forms 
of rebel governance, which are in their base an attempt to create forms of order 
which enable the rebels to govern and meet their own objectives in a manner which 
is relatively stable, and which ensures the continuing authority of the rebel group.7 
This general definition is important because it allows for a wide range of rebel end 
goals, from secession to state capture and/or the imposition of revolutionary 
ideology, while also recognising that achieving these meta-goals may not be 
possible and that simple endurance and survival may become the main motivation. 
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While rebel end goals will of course have an impact upon the way in which they 
govern, this is merely a variable within the wider need to maintain authority and 
order. The definition offered here is important because it also opens up the 
possibility of examining how rebel governance depends upon order, how it must take 
into account other components of order and how order is negotiated and/or evolves. 
In this sense the metaphor of an arena in which order is framed and negotiated is 
especially useful,8 order emerges from interactions in this arena which may be based 
on coercion and violence, deal-making and bargaining, co-optation and co-operation, 
or through iterative practices and sociocultural innovation and evolution. 
In much literature dealing with conflict and post-conflict situations a binary distinction 
between order and disorder is utilised, with rebel groups, and their often violent 
ways, representing the very forces of disorder themselves. This obscures the reality 
that some form of order - however fluid and violent - is always present, and that it is 
constantly being negotiated and renegotiated, evolving and re-evolving. Order is 
never pure or static in either its social or political guises. Equally, both social and 
political forms of order are deeply intertwined. Thus while it can be helpful in 
managing complexity to study these forms of order as separate categories, the next 
step must always be to examine how they interact and reinforce each other. As Mary 
Kaldor famously identified in her provocative 'New Wars' thesis in 1998, and later 
defended, '[n]ew wars are fought in the name of identity (ethnic, religious or tribal)... 
Perhaps most importantly, identity politics is constructed through war. Thus political 
mobilisation around identity is the aim of war rather than an instrument of war, as 
was the case in "old wars"'.9 Identity, of course, is an important form of social order, 
and is an outcome of various ordering processes - in this sense it becomes both an 
agent and a structure of order. Indeed, it is perfectly normal for rebel groups to cloak 
themselves in some form of identity politics as this is an important ordering and 
legitimating tool which facilitates their governance of a population. What this quote 
from Kaldor neglects however, is that these forms of identity, and the social and 
political orders with which they are connected, pre-date these modern conflicts, thus 
while war may further construct identity politics, those identities and their connected 
orders also shape the ways in which war is fought, legitimacy is framed and social 
and political orders function. Just as identity is rarely ever a cloak which can be worn 
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and discarded at will, likewise existing orders will always have an impact upon newly 
constructed orders brought about by conflict.10  
Order thus has much to offer us in terms of the study of processes of rebel 
governance, reflecting as it does on the ways in which meaning is created out of 
interactions, discourse, symbols and power based relationships. It gathers in the 
diversity of human society and forces us to understand rebel groups as being very 
much part of that society. This is vital if we are to capture wider processes and avoid 
focusing too intently on the 'rebel' in rebel governance. In sum, the reification of rebel 
groups as being unusual, or as a cause or symptom of disorder, is always going to 
be unhelpful. Rebels clearly are a part of an ordering process, often an important 
part, but they are never in complete control of that process. This reality therefore 
forces us to focus on the interaction of the rebels with a whole range of ordering 
forces at play. As Joel Migdal pointed out in 1988 in his Strong Societies and Weak 
States11 and later in his State in Society,12 if formalised state structures are so 
penetrated by societal and cultural norms, even, as Chabal and Deloz,13 or Bayart, 
Ellis and Hibou14 demonstrate in the African context, to the extent that the state is 
overtaken by them; it is equally likely that rebel groups' governance abilities and the 
order over which they preside, whether largely collusive, coexistent or coercive in 
nature, will also be shaped by a range of factors and actors. 
Ordering Structures  
Clearly there are a range of different ordering structures which have been identified 
across varying traditions and disciplines of social-scientific study and it is important 
to outline some of the key forms before examining more closely how they interact in 
processes of order negotiation. What follows is a brief overview which both sets the 
scene and is subsequently used to facilitate the construction of the analytical 
framework. 
Social Order  
In terms of day-to-day ordering structures within society it is important to get beyond 
simplistic notions of patron-client relationships, which while often important for the 
structure of both social and political order, obscure the deeper ways in which social 
order is produced, both through and beyond patron-client ties. These often originate 
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in micro-level social conditions, such as the production of goods and provision of 
services and the iterative processes of transaction, distribution and redistribution of 
goods, favours and relationships with their inbuilt systems of reciprocity, trust and 
sociability. All of these 'produce order through their effects on how individuals 
understand the world'.15 Naturally, these processes rely upon, reinforce and evolve 
other norms, beliefs and values. Over time, these processes intertwine to form what 
Migdal terms 'configurations of symbols'16 which then allow for the formation and 
functioning of formal or informal organisations, which can play larger roles in 
formulating and regulating order. These processes also link together informal 
economies with larger more formal economies which often need to be more fully 
regulated by more formalised organisations as diversity increases within the system. 
While forms of social order often emerge and are co-constituted by forms of 
economic order, often however, economic co-dependence is insufficient as an 
ordering mechanism in its own right and culture then provides extra glue to link 
social order with economic order and to bind the constituent parts of each together in 
multiple ways.  
There have been many attempts to formulate clear ideas of what constitutes social 
order. Marx focused on the underpinning economic relationships, Durkheim on 
shared norms,17 while sociologists such as Talcott Parsons have framed it through 
institutions of society, which are themselves framed in large part through culture and 
its associated values.18 All of these clearly have value and explore the underlying 
structures which will then express themselves as institutions in which people come 
together. This includes family, tribal and clan units, religion, business, educational 
establishments, sports clubs, or indeed in institutions made up of norms and cultural 
practices themselves, which impact upon the structure of social order. Thus cultural 
order both produces identity and expectations of values and norms; moral 
communities supply mediating mechanisms where states and rebels do not or 
cannot provide them.19 These moral codes also influence wider structures of order in 
society and come to pervade economic and social life. Traditionally though, violence 
is seen as an exception to these processes, violence represents 'the breakdown of 
meaning [and] the advent of the irrational',20 but it may well be integral to many forms 
of order, including cultural order. The utility of discriminate violence connected to the 
actions of individuals are a tool to shape behaviour, thus upholding collaboration and 
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control over an area as Kalyvas has found21 but violence often has to be used in 
conformity with local ordering practices if it is to be a truly effective tool in upholding 
rebel governance. 
Traditionally there have been two ways of explaining processes by which order 
emerges. Firstly that people give up rights and freedoms to a state which has a 
preponderance in coercive power in return for an ordered and predictable society. 
The second focuses on how the internalisation of norms and values by individuals 
produces social order, in one violence is key, the other socialisation.22 Clearly 
though, the two go hand in hand, they are processes which influence each other, 
and especially so in cases of rebel governance where rebels are so often operating 
on the very land, and within the very society, which nurtured them. 
Territoriality is an important and frequently overlooked reality, and yet for rebel 
governance is often crucial. The relationship between people and land is deeply 
political in most societies. Territoriality is also, as Robert Sack points out, 'the 
attempt by an individual or group, to affect influence or control people, phenomena 
or relationships, by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area.'23 
However we can go beyond Sack's conception by focusing on the political meanings 
of territory for those not only who wish to control but for those who inhabit that space. 
In this sense the control territoriality upon which Sack focuses, can be 
complemented by a comprehension territoriality which understands the order(s) 
present in that territory and how they also shape the ability of control territoriality to 
function.24 It is through the interaction of the two that political order, which is the 
ultimate expression of territoriality can be best understood. 
Political Order 
Political Orders emerged as groups began to outgrow the ability to administer 
themselves through personal contact, as Jared Diamond puts it: 'it's impossible even 
for citizens of tiny Tuvalu to know all 10,000 fellow citizens...hence states need 
police, laws, and codes of morality...large populations cannot function without 
leaders who make the decisions, executives who carry out the decisions, and 
bureaucrats who administer the decisions'.25 Diamond has of course been criticised 
for his focus on violence between tribal societies and for not 'appreciat[ing] the 
strong social forces mobilised by kinsmen to restrain anyone contemplating a hasty 
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and violent act that will expose all of them to danger', James Scott also points out 
that states and state-like structures are often more violent that the societies which 
they replaced.26 The question is how these strong social forces and the violent 
authorities which replaced tribes interacted and co-existed. 
As Francis Fukuyama explains, humans developed state-like institutions because 
order (in this sense, forms of co-operation) already existed rather than because it 
was fully imposed upon them or because individual decisions were made to cede 
sovereignty and the use of violence to the state - in other words the social order thus 
evolved naturally into political order.27 Thus as Samuel Huntingdon explains '[t]he 
level of political community a society achieves reflects the relationship between its 
political institutions and the social forces which comprise it'.28 They are co-
constitutive and this, to a large extent necessitates the rulers maintaining a degree of 
legitimacy in order to function. 
Legitimacy 
Often studies of rebel governance will focus on legitimacy as the counterpart to the 
use of violence when exploring how rebel groups survive, grow and govern. In this 
way legitimacy is an important component of the ordering processes engaged in by 
rebel groups because it is a method of wielding power without (always) using 
violence. Legitimacy is generally generated with reference to local norms, identities 
and realities which resonate with target populations. In this sense it attempts to link 
to local ordering practices and structures but can equally derive strength by 
challenging these same processes. Therefore the link between legitimacy and order 
is not directly analogous, indeed legitimacy takes different forms (or combinations of 
forms) depending on the circumstances. Thus pragmatic forms of legitimacy are 
based on things such as the provision of services, protection or even a willingness to 
share power, while moral legitimacy is founded on narratives of goodness, 
compatibility with existing norms and moral codes, as well as those which are 
explicitly referenced against religion or ethnicity.29  
We should also realise that legitimacy is something which is as much accepted, 
embraced or challenged as it is framed, constructed and marketed. It is, like the 
shaping of order itself, co-constituted between a rebel group and its audience(s). 
Legitimacy can be received actively or passively and can of course wax and wane 
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over time. It may therefore act as a mirror to wider changes and challenges to rebel 
governance more broadly. As an important tool of power, any diminishment in rebel 
legitimacy will make it harder for rebel governance to influence the wider order in 
which rebel governance operates. This, in turn, may disrupt the ability of rebels to 
meet their own objectives in a manner which is relatively stable, and which ensures 
the continuing authority of the rebel group. In other words, if rebel governance 
disrupts order too much or is resisted by other ordering agents or societal institutions 
then there is a risk that rebel governance capacities more generally may decline 
(perhaps leading to the greater use of violence) - contestation over rebel legitimacy 
is itself partly reflective of wider negotiations over the shape of order. 
Negotiating Order 
The structures which play a role in the creation of order are many and varied, their 
interactions complex and shifting, and the key actors which uphold and shape order 
are diverse and possess different kinds of authority and power. It is thus inevitable 
that any rebel group which seeks to impose any form of governance (which of course 
is, in and of itself, a form of ordering device) upon a population will not encounter a 
tabula rasa. Instead, it enters upon a complex socio-political field and must compete 
with the power and authority of existing actors, norms, traditions and structures. In 
the earliest stages of a rebel group attempting to shape or impose a socio-political 
order which enables, and interlinks with, governance it is likely that coercive factors, 
and especially the group's violent capacities, will be the most commonly used tool of 
power. Despite this, it will often be the case that the rebel group will not have a clear 
field, even in terms of violent capabilities, with the existing government, local defence 
units, criminal gangs and even other rebel groups operating in the same terrain.30   
We must of course recognise that rebel governance may take a number of different 
forms and be conducted in different styles. Some rebels may govern by taking and 
holding territory to create proto-states, others may not have sufficient resources to 
formally hold territory in such an overt manner and may instead look at temporary or 
temporal forms of governance, while others still may exert control from a distance, 
using psychological techniques or surveillance.  
What is certain however is that rebels must engage with civilian populations in some 
way and exercise enough control over them to facilitate their aims. Thus, we can 
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perhaps best conceive of rebel governance as a broad spectrum along which groups 
will move, as circumstances - opportunities and constraints - allow. This fits well with 
Paul Richards' concept of 'no peace - no war' in which he envisages the absence of 
binary notions of war and peace and embraces a spectrum in which full war and full 
peace are never actually reached.31 The complementarity here is enhanced by the 
continuing need of the rebel group to use violence as part of their system of 
governance, as order shifts and threatens their interests or authority. This image of 
rebel governance as being almost infinitely flexible, further fits with the very idea of 
order as something which is subject to constant forms of continuing negotiation 
amongst various actors which hold resources of violence, persuasion and legitimacy.  
Conflict is, by its very nature, highly disruptive to existing forms of order, especially 
since it is so often a direct challenge to some kind of existing order. This does not 
mean however that existing forms of order do not survive during conflict but that they 
tend to be either very localised, or more general forms of social and cultural order 
which are long established. Conflict is likely to also accelerate the evolution of order; 
providing opportunities, imposing new constraints and causing social change.32 It is 
likely that traditional authorities, local actors and traditional ethical and moral codes 
will be marginalised if they lack the ability to engage in the successful application of 
violence. This does not mean, once a rebel group has established some form of 
order through a violent power preponderance, that these existing ordering forces and 
structures cannot re-emerge into a new environment and continue to play important 
roles in the negotiation and enforcement of order. Both modified forms of previous 
order and familiar 'age old' practices can assert or reassert themselves in a new 
more stable environment - this can of course be the case both in terms of ordering 
actors, as well as norms, rules and customs which retain legitimacy and utility. In fact 
a wide range of groups - civilians, pre-existing authority figures and the rebels 
themselves - are apt to reach for ideas from the past which give a sense of return to 
normalcy and which can best facilitate survival, profit and power.33 Clearly, violence 
has limits of utility and must be supplemented by other tools of order. Quite where 
these limits lie remains difficult to pin down given the many variables involved, thus 
violence remains an essential tool in the box of rebel governance but it is rapidly 
replaced by other mechanisms, depending on their availability and the specific 
circumstances and actors involved. 
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In order to succeed in creating a form of order which enables governance, and then 
to continue to uphold that order over the longer term, it must be recognised that 
since the sum of order is a mixture of different styles and types of order with different 
roots, it is very unlikely that rebel governance will be entirely dominant. In fact, 
depending on the situation, the rebels may in fact be little more than primi inter pares 
and may hold little more than their capabilities for violence. In these circumstances 
the rebels will be even more reliant upon existing ordering structures in order to 
govern. Clearly the levels of support, legitimacy and capabilities (bureaucratic, 
technical, financial and violent) which the rebel group enjoys will influence their 
ability to govern and in turn to shape order. Likewise, the resilience and legitimacy of 
existing ordering structures and agents will also shape the extent to which rebel 
governance can re-shape order.34 
It is also important to realise that different elements of order are challenged and 
evolve at different rates, the rebel group may well be an important actor in some of 
these but in others may lack the power, legitimacy and authority to influence, or may 
simply not perceive an interest in attempting to influence, events. The reality is that 
there are multiple fields of play in which elements of order are negotiated and evolve, 
and yet all of these fields will have some impact upon each other, and upon the 
general form of order which exists within, and even beyond, the sphere of rebel 
governance. 
A Framework For Exploring Order Negotiations In Rebel Governance 
In order to construct a framework for examining the negotiations of order, we must 
first identify the levels of analysis with which we are engaging. In deploying clear 
levels of analysis we can focus on the specific dynamics of each level and then also 
explore how the order negotiation at each level in turn impacts on negotiations at 
other levels. The simplest identification of levels of analysis relies on the 
identification of coherent groups but is also based to some extent on the geographic 
realities in place. Other levels can, of course, subsequently be added if required 
within these levels. It should be made clear that this is not an attempt to build a 
theory but more of a initial tool which can structure deeper forms of investigation of 
the negotiations present when rebels attempt to govern, and how order is crucial to 
rebel governance. Thus three obvious levels of analysis when it comes to the 
James Worrall                                            12        Small War & Insurgencies, Vol. 28, Nos. 4&5 
(2017)                                              
 
negotiation of order within spaces influenced by attempts at rebel governance 
present themselves: firstly the internal rebel order, secondly, other societal agents 
and structures of order, and thirdly, external orders which influence the territory in 
question. 
As the named actor, a critical element in the negotiation of rebel governance are the 
internal discussions within the rebel group - how different rebels view the constraints 
and possibilities for the production of order is essential, as are their individual 
hierarchy of group and personal needs and objectives. Thus, clearly the internal 
dynamics of the rebel group are vital. If the rebels are divided in their aims in 
negotiating order they can be co-opted or penetrated by other actors and will be 
unable to readily shape order. If they are united in aim and will then they will have 
more opportunities to shape order and thus to govern. Thus the internally negotiated 
order within the rebel group is essential. This level of analysis has received 
increasing attention in recent years with various approaches being taken principally 
to understand when and where these groups use violence. Thus, for example, Paul 
Staniland examines rebel coherencHDVEHLQJFRPSRVHGRIWKHµKRUL]RQWDO¶OLQNDJHV
DPRQJVWUHEHOOHDGHUVDQGµYHUWLFDOO\¶WRLWVVXSSRUWLQVRFLHW\+HIRUPXODWHVDIRXU-
fold typology, thus, µLQWHJUDWHG¶ JURXSV KDYH VWURQJ FRKHVLRQ LQ ERWK WKHVH
FDWHJRULHV µSDURFKLDO¶ UHEHOV KDYH ZHDN FRKesion at the centre but strong local 
OLQNDJHV µYDQJXDUG¶groups have a strong centre but weak local bases, and finally 
µIUDJPHQWHG¶ JURXSV ZKLFK KDYH QHLWKHU35 His work is further important in that it 
alerts us to the pre-war origins of rebel groups and the changes in group dynamics 
and cohesion over time. We should also recognise that as in the example of the 
continuum in the previous section rebel governance will fluctuate, even to the extent 
that it may not look much like governance at some points in time.36 
Rebel groups may disagree on specific aims, the order in which they are to be 
ranked and the means by which to achieve them. They are also clearly affected by 
structural factors, thus as Jeremy Weinstein has argued, '[l]eadership, skill, and 
ideology all take a backseat to broader, macro-level factors that structure the 
universe of possibilities individual rebels confront',37 he also argues that 'groups 
commit high levels of abuse not because of ethnic hatred or because it benefits them 
strategically but instead because their membership renders group leaders unable to 
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discipline and restrain the use of force ± and membership is determined in important 
ways by the endowments leaders have at their disposal at the start of a rebellion'.38 
Indiscriminate violence is probably the most likely to result in resistance from other 
ordering forces. 
Equally, the more a rebel group's internal order is weak and contested, the more 
likely it is to be influenced by other actors and the less likely it is to be able to govern, 
i.e. to resist or influence other forms of order. The internal order of the rebel group is 
crucial to the wider negotiation of order. In the case of Hezbollah, group cohesion 
and internal order is generally quite strong. Hezbollah is often portrayed as being 
essentially the ultimate rebel group, with its charismatic and wily leader in charge of 
a slick operation which is unified, coherent and obedient to the will of the leadership. 
Yet Hezbollah is by no means immune from the pressures facing any other 
organisation, in fact 'the movement has been unable to divorce itself from the clan, 
WULEHDQGIDPLO\VWUXFWXUHVRIWKH6KL¶D,'39 from which it emerged in the early 1980s, 
this requires a careful balancing of diverse interests and the deployment of internal 
discipline and inducement to manage the different factions and interests within 
Hezbollah. From its beginnings as 'an organization originally established as a 
religious network with narrowly defined politico-socioeconomic goals, [it] has eroded. 
Many of its individual cells now serve primarily their own self-interest instead of their 
perception RI*RG¶VZLOO', it is becoming increasingly well known that the movement 
allows its members to engage in private illicit activities.40 This has become a key 
internal ordering tool and in turn allows the movement to maintain its core activities 
and thus to govern the areas which it controls. 
Structure & Agency 
Clearly all of this raises questions of the interactions of structure and agency in these 
complex ordering processes. Without wishing to get too embroiled in these debates, 
this article takes a viewpoint in which the role of agency is enhanced by structure but 
wishes also to recognise that most structures can be (slowly) re-shaped by agency. 
Clearly, agents and structures mutually enact forms of order and it is difficult to 
separate the two. In this sense Anthony Giddens' theory of structuration is a direct 
inspiration here.41 The theory however is not directly amenable to use en bloc as a 
tool which is why it is perhaps more useful as a device which alerts us to the way in 
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which order is shaped over space and time by the interaction of various ordering 
forces with which the rebels must often engage whilst attempting to govern. 
It is therefore useful if we also add in the work of Pierre Bourdieu here, since it is 
important to recognise that different forms of order are present in different spheres of 
activity and at different times. Thus there are different orders which co-exist with 
each other and there are also commonalities and overlaps which join these areas 
together, and as a whole they produce a wider form of order in given territorial 
spaces. Bourdieu calls these separate spheres fields42 and it is a concept which is 
designed to bridge the agency-structure dichotomy and has some clear 
complementarity to Giddens' theory. By focusing on the more specific dynamics of 
order within smaller spheres it is possible to track actors interactions and the impacts 
of agency on these interactions, thus we can then begin to judge the impact of rebel 
governance upon the orders present in different fields and to judge by their impacts 
both the relative power distributions but also the level of importance rebels attach to 
each separate field - this in turn then might enable a greater understanding of the 
impact of rebel governance upon the broader form of order which emerges from the 
interactions of the different fields (large and small) within the wider societal order. 
Indeed, within this wider order it could be said that the internal order of a rebel group 
is itself a field but one where the outcomes have impacts in other but not necessarily 
all fields.  
This discussion leads us on to the second level of analysis which is much wider than 
the internal order of the rebels, and can be considered to be all of the other agents 
and structures of order located within the specific population the rebels target, or if 
the population is mixed, the specific area in which the rebels attempt to govern.43 
These aspects of order are likely to be much more diverse and dependent upon 
cultural, economic and political realities. Identifying key actors, be they traditional 
authority figures, those with technical know-how, connections or who are 
entrepreneurial, in all senses of the word, is critical here in exploring the interests, 
power resources and skills at play and where negotiations will be necessary, over 
what, when and with what likely outcomes.  
Hezbollah initially used violence to contain and control its rivals. This was especially 
the case with the Lebanese Communist Party,44 and Amal, its main competitor, 
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which Hezbollah confronted militarily in the famous War of the Camps between 1985 
and 1989.45 Once defeated, Amal has survived as an ordering structure, with 
Hezbollah recognising that it has legitimacy and influence, and that should it be 
destroyed, predictable (and useful) patterns of order would be disrupted, which may 
also damage Hezbollah's authority and legitimacy. Hezbollah prefers to work with 
Amal, create space for it and to benefit from co-habitation. Indeed, for over a decade 
now Amal and Hezbollah have had electoral pacts which protect the representation 
of both parties in Parliament.46 This is also in part a recognition of the clan structures 
present in the territory controlled or influenced by both parties. This recognition of 
local realities even extends to the protection of the position of religious and ethnic 
minorities who live in Hezbollah controlled areas. 
These key agents alone however (whether they are co-opted, ignored or if they resist 
the rebels), while often useful proxies with interests in using their agency to uphold 
their position in the existing structure of order, are insufficient in conceptualising this 
second level of analysis of how order functions in rebel governed areas. 
It is crucial here to make a distinction here between different levels: firstly, the 
existing social, economic and political structures themselves, secondly, the key 
agents in positions of power, i.e. those with capital, and finally, the broader mass of 
weaker players whose agency is expressed in different ways. These three levels can 
to some extent be mapped onto Bourdieu's three key concepts. Thus the first is 
analogous to the idea of the field outlined above, the second with its focus on the key 
agents who have the most resources, or as Bourdieu puts it, capital, to deploy on 
that field,47 finally, the third level is in many ways analogous to Bourdieu's conception 
of habitus which are those broad tendencies which structure how people perceive 
and understand the social world and interact with it. The importance of habitus is that 
it is the expression of intuition, or fuzzy logic and that decisions or moves made this 
way are often almost instinctive and occur without rational thought.  Meaning that 
how social order is reproduced is often the result of the way in which the habitus of 
individuals interacts with that of others.48 
Where we depart from Bourdieu is in his conception of social actors (especially in 
this third level) as automatons.49 It is clear that in some circumstances actors, in the 
sense here of the 'general public', rather than those with extensive forms of capital at 
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their disposal, may decide to uphold existing facets of order either through continuing 
to act according to these practices or by actively correcting those who do not.50 This 
may not however always be the case, since the composition of habitus in individuals 
differs and therefore the ways in which it is expressed can lead to social change over 
time. It is this third level which is by far the most difficult to study and to predict 
because it can be both a force for stasis and for change in structures of order. It is 
this unpredictable social sense, or to some extent the unified feeling of crowds, 
which can spur acts of resistance both large and small.51 To illustrate this we can 
take two examples of resistance to Daesh or the so-called Islamic State. The first is 
just one story from Raqqa in which the group's feared morality police were about to 
beat an old woman whose dress did not exactly meet their interpretation of modesty 
and who was surrounded and defended by her fellow citizens who angrily contested 
the norms used to justify the punishment with direct reference to local practices 
present in Raqqa.52 The second, much more high-profile, act of resistance was when 
the citizens of Mosul came out to defend the city's famous minaret from 
destruction.53 These examples show the limits even of the most brutal and 
unpredictable form of rebel governance and highlights the limits of violence. In 
Lebanon, while Hezbollah are now dominant actors in their main zones of control - 
the Bekaa Valley, South of the Litani and Beirut's southern suburbs, the Dahiyya - 
even within these zones are diverse populations which have been shaped by norms, 
values and interests which are common across Lebanon.54 There are after all plenty 
of Shi'a who are not especially religious and whose worldview is shaped more by 
other realities which come from wider Lebanon and beyond. Similarly, there remain 
existing structures and authorities which retain a role in shaping order. Thus while 
Daniel Meier notes that, '[the] quasi-state capacity enjoyed by Hizbullah in the former 
occupied zone [south of the Litani] allowed the movement to define new social rules 
(e.g. compliance to the party, Islamic morality, refraining from vengeance)',55 equally, 
Hezbollah's attempts to ban the sale of alcohol and the mixing of the sexes in 
southern cities of Sur and Tyre did not go down well with the population and had to 
be scaled back. When faced with social norms which had developed through contact 
between faiths over centuries and the economic reality that many Lebanese travel to 
the beaches of southern Lebanon at the weekend and for holidays, Hezbollah had to 
rapidly recognise that even Islamic norms (and its own power) have limits.56 
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Our final level of analysis is equally important and consists of the continuing potential 
for external actors to both affect order within the zone(s) of rebel governance and to 
structure the wider order within which the rebel group operates. It will always be the 
case that rebels are in competition with other actors, and especially the central state. 
We must also recognise that absolute monopolisation may not always be the aim of 
civil war actors, either because they cannot, or simply do not wish to, achieve this 
level of control.57 Equally, as we have seen thus far, monopolisation requires very 
high levels of resources and skill to achieve. This means that there is a consistently 
high chance that localised, even formalised, arrangements are likely to have to be 
reached with a potentially wide range of other actors. These arrangements may even 
be alliances or agreements which usually impose limits on violence.58 These 
'ordering deals' might be motivated by differing long-term or short-term 
considerations, and can produce a wide range of collusive ordered relationships at 
the tactical, operational and strategic levels. These deals can draw in a range of 
actors and are not always likely to be as obvious as formalised relations between 
specific organisations. Indeed, as Ana Arjona points out, these forms of order 
between rebels and external actors are likely to be specific to localities59 and are 
equally like to be have been negotiated between sub-factions of different entities, 
and especially of the state itself.60  
In Hezbollah's case, the Lebanese political system requires the building of alliances, 
a game in which Hezbollah has been remarkably successful. This is because the 
Party has been influenced by existing ordering practices, despite its initial opposition 
to them, it has in effect been socialised into the Lebanese cultural and political 
milieu. Once outside its own Shi'a  arena (to which, as we have seen, it has adapted) 
Hezbollah frequently acts moderately in negotiations with other potential partners 
such as the Christian, Free Patriotic Movement.61 The existence of both tacit and 
formally negotiated alliances is an important part of Hezbollah's attempt to order 
politics in its own interest within Lebanon.  
Hezbollah's initial reasons for entering into direct politics and participating in 
elections were defensive, clearly indicating that the possession of the means of 
violence and a clear powerbase emerging from areas in which Hezbollah had been 
able to structure order largely in its own interests and image, were insufficient for the 
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group's long term success or even perhaps survival.62 Entering this new game of 
playing a role in negotiating the shape of the national order necessitated an 
acceptance of the need for compromise, alliance management and formal pact 
making. Having established its position in the Lebanese political system Hezbollah 
seems content to largely work within these confines, only using its coercive 
capabilities when its core interests are threatened, as in 2009 over its 
telecommunications network.63 
Facilitating Analysis - Existing and (Re-)Emergent Orders 
The next category of analysis combines with these levels of analysis and works 
through them. This is especially visible in terms of the second level of analysis and 
requires the division of order into its broad constituent categories identified above. 
Thus specific examination of social order, economic order, cultural order and political 
order is required. This enables us to examine how rebel governance attempts to 
shape each of these fields, to place specific actors and norms as either enabling or 
constraining rebel governance, and to explore how negotiations take place and what 
their outcomes are. Facilitating this analysis is extremely difficult without using 
specific themes or issues. Thus for example the rebels' ability to govern market 
interactions in towns they control can tell us much about how order has been 
structured and what level of influence rebel governance has in setting the rules, 
governing disputes and extracting resources for themselves.64 
There will always be a temptation to focus on the upper levels of rebel governance 
and their interactions with other senior 'ordering actors' such as tribal and religious 
leaders, the central government, other rebel group leaders and influential 
businessmen. This is natural and simplifies analysis but leaves us without a clear 
picture either of the full range of institutions which play a role in the ordering process, 
or of the role of less visible actors. This is especially the case when it comes to the 
ability of the wider population to influence shifts in norms over time, or indeed to 
attempt to directly influence rebel governance in its negotiations with other actors. 
Thus it is important to distinguish between direct negotiating partners in terms of the 
structuring and enforcement of order but also to recognise the role of indirect order 
negotiation when there is no formal interlocutor, as patterns of behaviour and co-
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existence emerge and evolve over time - shaped as much by these informal 
negotiations as those between formal actors. 
It is important to capture the dynamism and evolutionary nature of order of all kinds 
and at all levels of analysis, and measuring continuity and change is an important 
means of exploring the negotiations of order over the longer term. There is frequently 
much work already in existence which can be used to highlight continuities in social 
organisation and order in many societies. Focusing analysis on examining how forms 
of order re-emerge after conflict or in the spaces created by rebel governance is a 
useful focus of analysis. Equally, examining how these orders have evolved because 
of conflict can also allow us to identify the likely limits of rebels' ability to shape the 
space they inhabit. Thus, identifying what has and has not changed, and what the 
processes of change have been can tell us much about just how much ability rebels 
have to influence change in the areas they attempt to govern.  
Hezbollah have had a number of advantages and have been quick to utilise them in 
order to solidify their support and create an identity based on a mixture of Shi'a 
Islam, othering, deprivation and a narrative of oppression which facilitates their 
goals.65 We should also not forget that '[t]he concept of istid`aaf (oppression) unites 
WKH µVRFLDO¶ ZLWK WKH SROLWLFDO DQG LV D FRQFHSW GUDZQ GLUHFWO\ from religious 
teachings',66 this religious dimension can be overlooked when examining this 
discourse but it pervades the social provisions Hezbollah makes and is clearly based 
on existing ordered practices in Lebanon, and especially the clientelism of the old 
zu'ama system linked to Shi'a clans.67 The Lebanese confessional system which 
orders politics and society clearly has an internal logic which has led to a need to 
protect your own community's interests. Political parties in Lebanon have long been 
involved in the provision of social welfare services to their communities.68 These 
have an important, indeed quite foundational ordering function, they reinforce power, 
create dependencies, structures, patterns and predictability, leading to trust attained 
by iterative interaction. Initially for Hezbollah, one of the earliest reasons for 
providing these social services was, as its leader Hassan Nasrallah put it: 'to keep 
the people on their land, to prevent emigration from the villages'.69 It is of course 
hard for rebels to govern if there is no-one present in the areas they control. 
Styles of Rebel Governance 
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Different rebel groups clearly express their attempts to manage order negotiation in 
different ways. The very style of governance which the rebels adopt (whether 
coercive, co-existent or co-operative) can tell us much about their approach to the 
negotiations of order, which in turn are linked to the opportunities and constraints 
which they face. Thus an important part of the jigsaw when exploring order 
negotiations which facilitate rebel governance is to explicitly attempt to define the 
board style adopted by the rebels when it comes to their attempts at governance. 
Whereas the earlier part of the framework examined specifically how the rebels 
negotiate their internal ordering process, this factor instead demonstrates the 
outcomes of this process. The coherence of the rebels when they decide upon a 
position, and their ability to rule,70 translates into a certain style of governance which 
often fits a pattern, with different rebel groups focusing on different issues, having 
different interests, aims and approaches to engaging with negotiating partners.71 
While this is of course also a function of the constraints imposed upon the rebels by 
other actors and social forces in both levels two and three of the framework, there is 
also an identifiable tendency for rebel groups, like any other organisation, to evolve 
into a certain style which may include predictability emanating from standard 
operating procedures, the limits of group cohesion, worldview and patterns of 
previous interaction. Identifying the general style of rebel governance allows us to 
treat the rebels as more of a unified actor and to explore their specific role, choices 
and abilities when it comes to the range of different negotiations over order. It is also 
of course useful at this point to again deploy the device of the spectrum of order 
which allows us to see how the order created by the rebels has developed over time, 
and how it compares to other possibilities for rebel led-order. This leads us to ask 
questions about what has led rebel governance to this point and to reflect back upon 
the analysis and how it might be further developed. 
Conclusion 
Exploring the constellation of actors and institutions which play a role in the 
configuration of order both during and after conflict forces us to explore the complex 
negotiations at multiple levels which create the ordered space in which rebels are 
able to govern. To be able to exercise authority over the longer term, some form of 
order must be created which leads to a degree of stability and predictability in social, 
economic and political life. Rebels play a continuing role in the negotiations which 
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shape this order, while also relying upon order to rule. This symbiotic relationship is 
crucial to understanding the nature of rebel governance across place and time. Our 
definition of rebel governance as: an attempt to create forms of order which enable 
the rebels to govern and meet their own objectives in a manner which is relatively 
stable, and which ensures the continuing authority of the rebel group is helpful in 
facilitating this examination. 
As we have seen, analysing these negotiations is not simple but is amenable to 
study if broken down and examined through different ordering prisms and by working 
out what the key ordering processes, norms and actors are. The three level 
framework of the internal rebel order, the other societal agents and structures of 
order, and the external orders which influence the space in question offers multiple 
sites of analysis. Where previous studies have tended to focus extensively on rebel 
politics and external politics (the first and third levels) and to reify the role of violence, 
this new model offers the opportunity to explore the wider environment which shapes 
and is shaped by multiple fields of order, multiple ordering agents and the wider 
social habitus of individuals and groups. Rebel coherence, will, power and legitimacy 
thus play a key role in ensuring their ability to govern and shape order but are by no 
means the only factors. It is the second level, the deeper forms of social order which 
often play a significant, and oft overlooked, role in enabling and constraining rebel 
governance. 
All of this leads us to ask where the natural limits of rebel governance might lie, 
especially given that this article has argued that rebel governance is subject to 
ongoing negotiation as order shifts and evolves over time. While Hezbollah has 
undoubtedly come a very long way in its ability to negotiate and thus shape multiple 
forms of order across Lebanon, one might legitimately ask, to what end? Clearly the 
Party of God has had to compromise during negotiations over the shape of both 
political and social order in the country. Is rebel governance then, simply a phase 
before integration into the state, or is it a permanent condition? Clearly, the various 
path dependencies and lineages created suggest that either of these outcomes can 
occur, but equally, rebel governance has proven transitory in the past and many 
rebel groups have been unable to govern and have not survived. It is likely that 
continuing rebel governance depends entirely on the durability and stability of the 
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order which is created, and the ability of the rebels to hold the ring in terms of the 
continuing negotiations over this order. Here the proxy measurement of rebel 
legitimacy is often used in much of the literature but as has been argued here, 
legitimacy is more of a reflection of rebel influence on order more broadly. As, if 
rebels misunderstand the ordering environment in which they find themselves, or 
misjudge their power they will either disrupt the order upon which they depend or find 
that other ordering agents or societal institutions may resist, having potentially 
deleterious consequences upon rebel legitimacy. Rebel legitimacy is then a useful 
proxy when combined with wider examinations which explore negotiations over the 
shape of order, but is best understood as a factor within the confines of order 
negotiation. 
It may be pertinent here to consider the concept of 'just enough power' which reflects 
this position. While power must be defended, (generally) expanded and used wisely, 
raw power (where based in violence or simple ideas of legitimacy) alone is 
insufficient to fully shape order and thus other abilities, especially those rooted in 
knowledge,72 must be deployed in the direct and indirect negotiations over the 
structure of order within which rebels govern. The main goal for rebel groups should 
simply be the creation of a stable form of order which best enables them to govern. 
This is a complex balancing act given the range of different forces at play. Using just 
enough power in this situation is inevitably better than using (or perhaps even 
having)  too little or too much power, for both of these situations create imbalances in 
order negotiation processes which lead to the disruption of order, which in the end 
only makes governance more difficult. Rebel governance therefore may be likened to 
spinning multiple plates which all operate according to different rules of physics. 
Unlike the popular image of rebels as forces of disorder, in reality, as Hezbollah 
shows, rebels must not only negotiate the construction of their own order, alongside 
and overlaying existing orders, but to facilitate their survival, they must also attempt 
to understand and manage the continuing evolution of numerous orders that overlap 
and intertwine at multiple levels - a task which perhaps explains why rebel 
governance so often fails.73 
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